A COLUMN WRITTEN BY KALIOPATE TAVOLA, PUBLISHED IN ISLANDS BUSINESS, MAR 2023
Regionalists generally identify three characteristics of regionalism, namely: economics, security and politics. Economic regionalism focuses on economic and financial aspects. Generally speaking, this is effectively an alternative reference to a trade bloc. Security regionalism focuses on peace and security. Political regionalism focuses on shared aims of the nation states and also work on any issues that any state may face. Overall, however, it can be said that all three forms of regionalism are interconnected and can overlap. Consequently, any analysis of regionalism is likely to exhibit all three characteristics. The 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent is no exception. However, given the relative weight of political issues vis-à-vis others, it can be said that it is political in its general orientation. As such, it can be classified as essentially political.
The political orientation of the 2050 Strategy can be gleaned from various sections of the Strategy including: Leaders’ Vision for 2050, Our Values, Leaders’ Commitments to 2050 and from the seven Thematic Areas. The latter includes respective Levels of Ambition up to 2050. Two politically laden themes, namely: ‘Political Leadership and Regionalism’ and ‘People Centred Development are foregrounded under Thematic Areas. Their respective ‘levels of ambition’ speak of the need for greater cooperation to safeguard, secure and progress the Blue Pacific Continent; unity and cohesiveness of political leadership; responsiveness of the regional architecture; recognition and respect for collective approach; drawing on cultural and spiritual attachment to land and the ocean; gender equality and equal access to public services so that no one is left behind.
From above, it is clear that the 2050 Strategy, whilst it contains some economic and financial aspects, is certainly not a trade bloc. This is just as well. Pacific regionalism has extremely poor records in this matter and in regional economic integration as a whole.
By way of clarification, the founders of the South Pacific Forum (SPF) in 1971 had wanted to pursue an ‘economic union’. It took 10 years for the SPF to get started. However, it was a misstep. SPF Leaders launched SPARTECA in 1981 – a preferential, non-reciprocal trade agreement instead of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). SPARTECA’s contribution to regional economic integration was thus minimal as can be expected.
In the early 2000s, the Forum launched its first FTA. The Pacific Regional Trade Agreement (PARTA) however did not get pass first base. Forum members lacked unity to get it signed. It was thus shelved and, in its place emerged PACER – an economic framework agreement between Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) on one hand and the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) on the other, and the FTA, Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) for PICs only. The last time I checked, PICTA is only being implemented by 50% if its membership. And that is its Trading in Goods agreement only. Its Trading in Services agreement has yet to be fully ratified. Moreover, more than 2 decades of its life have lapsed.
PACER, of course, has given rise to FTA, PACER Plus. To date, not all PICs have signed the FTA. Moreover, the two largest PICs and Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) trading giants – Fiji and Papua New Guinea, have opted out of the FTA.
The direction that the SPF Leaders wanted to pursue way back in 1971 – for regional economic integration and even with advanced economic and political integration in a trade bloc, has not materialized. It can be concluded that members of Pacific regionalism may lack the appetite for greater regional economic integration through trade. This is perhaps more apt for PICs than for ANZ, given the latter’s respective integration into the global trading system.
The lack of appetite is instructive but understandable. PICs, given their relative size, geography, resource endowment, relative economic status etc maybe are concerned about freeing up trade and the loss of tariff revenue apart from loss of any competitive edge in trading that may result. Notwithstanding the dominant political direction of the 2050 Strategy, the PIF Secretariat (PIFS), however is already taking essential economic-related measures to counter competition hitches under the 2050 Strategy’s Thematic Areas 2 (People Centred Development) and 4 (Resource and Economic Development). The Secretariat is to be commended for this.
Notwithstanding the lack of appetite for regional economic integration, Pacific regionalism existed and grew from 1971 for half a century to what it is today. As I will discuss below, it has been members’ political rationality that has been the driving force of Pacific regionalism to date and will continue to do so in the context of the 2050 Strategy going forward.
But first, it should be noted that the 2050 Strategy is definitely not a security type regionalism in its orientation, even though it has some security aspects to address. Thematic Area 3, for example, is titled ‘Peace and Security’. Greater amplification is given under its respective ‘Level of Ambition.’
The above makes a lot of sense. For Pacific regionalism, security as a form of threat, has already been rationalized and contextualized. For the Forum, its greatest existential security threat is climate change. The Forum’s relevant concerns and stratagem in this matter are enshrined under the Boe Declaration. This is likely to have an independent status vis-à-vis the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.
The political rationality of Pacific regionalism ever since its origin in 1971 is clearly discussed by Professor Greg Fry in his ‘Framing The Islands’ (2019). Essentially, Forum leaders, over the last 5 decades of the Forum’s existence, have found especially ‘political significance’ in the ways and means by which they had conducted their special brand of Pacific regionalism. Dr Fry discussed in his book such political significance and relative bearings, including developing strategic political arena, regional governance, regional political community, and diplomatic block.
It should be noted that the concept of ‘political community’ referred to by Dr Fry above is not that of the EU integration type: with its supra-national structures and even with a Parliament, even though such has been promoted for the region by a number of regional commentators, for example, Messrs Birman Prasad, Jim Rolfe and Waden Narsey. As Dr Fry discussed in his book, Pacific regionalism has its own brand of regional community by way of the Council of Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP) – 9 agencies altogether chaired by PIFS Secretary General. Such statement can be perceived as justification for the direction that Pacific regionalism has pursued in the last 5 decades. The litmus test for Pacific regionalism now is for the regional planners to conceive of a regional architecture that places PIF at the apex of this regional community. Such architectural design is PIF Leaders’ specification to the regional planners.
This will be an interesting exercise from the perspective of sovereignty. In the last 50 years of Pacific regionalism, PIF member states had not felt the need to transfer, nor the sharing of their respective sovereignty with regional bureaucrats. This explains the reasons for the lack of any supra-national structures under PIF. There are, of course, organizations that resulted from pooling of regional resources but with clear-cut member states’ oversight, like the University of the South Pacific. The question of course is whether this will remain PIF’s modus operandi for the next half century.
© Kaliopate Tavola and kaidravuni.com, 2025. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Kaliopate Tavola, kaidravuni.com and Islands Business with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.
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