A COLUMN WRITTEN BY KALIOPATE TAVOLA, PUBLISHED IN ISLANDS BUSINESS, NOV 2022

The US signed the Declaration on U.S.-Pacific Partnership with fourteen Pacific Island Countries (PICs) in Washington on 29 September 2022. Of the sixteen PICs, members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), popularly known as Pacific regionalism, only Niue and Kiribati did not sign. Their absence, however, was anticipated for reasons that were considered legitimate. Australia and New Zealand (ANZ), on the other hand and which completes the 18-member PIF/Pacific regionalism did not participate in the ceremony. They were not invited.

To give credence and legitimacy to the US, it can be said that its intentions had always been to sign this Declaration with the PICs. The eleven commitments, ‘the mounting challenges of our time’ in the Declaration, can be legitimately aligned directly to the interests of PICs.  

Three of the commitments, however, have references that are traditionally linked to the PIF in general. The first of these being the second commitment. It provides for the signatories of the Declaration/Partnership to bolstering Pacific regionalism. The implication here is not clear. Does it mean that the US will work to join force with the PICs to operationalize the various projects and processes of PIF that includes ANZ? Or does it mean that PICs will use the US as a filter for issues that they want to discuss with ANZ?

The sixth commitment resolves to protect the Blue Pacific and enhance the laws that govern it. The Blue Pacific is PIF’s own leitmotif and is also used by the group as its form of identity. Both ANZ can therefore relate to the Blue Pacific and its sub-themes of ‘ocean identity’, ‘ocean geography’, and ‘ocean resources’.  Does this commitment therefore bind ANZ into the Declaration of which they are not a part?

The Declaration’s seventh commitment resolves to maintain peace and security across the Blue Pacific Continent. The Blue Pacific Continent is merely an extension to the Blue Pacific and is formally appended to PIF’s own 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. Both ANZ are currently working with the PICs in developing the 2050 Strategy’s implementation plan and its architecture.

The commitment however is security-related and geostrategic in its intention. That automatically links itself to the roles of ANZ under existing arrangements – Australia, for instance under Indo-Pacific, the QUAD and AUKUS, and ANZ with the Blue Pacific (PBP).

It should be noted that when the PBP was first announced, it was received in the Pacific with much disapproval. Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, a Solomon Islands academic at the University of Hawaii, for instance, was reported to have said that such ‘initiative rides roughshod over established regional processes.”

Furthermore, PBP’s ‘strategic equilibrium’, its suggested device for seeking consensus whenever it consults with PIF, is unproven. Questions remain unanswered: What will be the sitting arrangement for ANZ when PIF consults with the PBP when they are members of both sides? Furthermore, what hat will they prefer to be wearing during such consultations?

What is its real purpose here under this Declaration? Your guess is as good as mine. Methinks that this is essentially a reminder of the US’s superiority in all matters of defence and security in the Pacific. Such an expression of superiority is so blatant even to the extent that any self-contradiction contained therein is considered as a fait accompli which requires no explanation.

The seventh commitment reaffirms the signatories’ ‘respect for the ability of nations to make sovereign decisions in the best interests of their people.’ It should be noted that this did not apply – initially perhaps, to the Solomon Islands Government (SIG) when it earlier signed a bilateral agreement with China under its own sovereignty. When the SIG was asked subsequently about its reason for signing the US Declaration, it was reported that it was because ‘China’ was eventually deleted from the text of the Declaration.

The central theme of the discussions above is the status of ANZ’s involvement, if any, that is implied in the implementation of the Declaration vis-à-vis the PICs. In the context of legal agreements – such as represented by this Declaration, non-signatories like ANZ will have no stake in its implementation. That is going to complicate the operationalization of PIF (with ANZ membership) in the context of this Declaration.  Like the PBP before it, therefore, this Declaration is likely to ‘ride roughshod over established regional processes.”

In trying to rationalize the situation above, it is tempting to label it as just a faux pas. This however can be ruled out given the extent and depth of the brains trust behind the formulation of the Declaration on both sides.

Was it a means of rebalancing on the part of the US? The US, as implied above, has been linked to ANZ in the formulation and operationalization of ANZUS, Indo-Pacific, QUAD, AUKUS and PBP. Washington may have been motivated therefore to redirect its interest and resources to the PICs this time around to demonstrate that it also cares for the PICs.

Some regional commentators may see the US move as compensatory. It is general knowledge that the PICs had shelved the Chinese approach for a multilateral agreement, comprising prospects of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and more. It was timely therefore for a compensatory move from Washington. The move was readily accepted given the readiness on the part of all the PICs present to wholeheartedly sign the agreement.

Washington’s specific interest in the PICs as a group is not new nor extraordinary. PICs/PSIDS is a sub-grouping acknowledged under the UN and some of the processes under its agencies, e.g. the SAMOA Pathway. The Declaration can therefore be an acknowledgement of such a grouping. This can be seen as a vote of confidence for the PICs, especially in its formulation as a PIC-only forum that is able to enter into negotiations with other fora, including extra-regional agencies.

In such a context, the perceived derogation by the US has a silver lining. It places recognition on a concept that has been around for some time and whose further applications for either regional and/or multilateral associations have been the subject of a number of exploratory analyses in the region.

The Pacific ACP members’ association with the EU since the days of Lome I is a good example. After over 50 years, its existence has not been placed in any doubt. A PICs-only forum that can associate with ANZ in a changed PIF architecture has been the subject of consultancies and papers, some of which have been published.

A PIC-only forum published under the title: ‘The United States of the Pacific’, was former Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga’s idea that could best promote PICs’ existential threat of climate change globally.  This paper was published before the 2019 PIF Leaders’ (PIFL) meeting in Funafuti. The paper must have made an impact since PIFL at that meeting opted to consider conceptualization of a PICs-only forum as a way forward.

Paragraph 8 of 2019 PIFL’s Communique states: “Leaders welcomed the offer by the PM of Tuvalu to commence dialogue with Leaders on a new 2050 vision for Pacific Island countries that recognized the Blue Pacific Continent that make up the territories and economic exclusive zones of the region and how Pacific Island countries can form an effective union, building on the SAMOA Pathway and the Boe Declaration, to ensure a safe and secure future for the Pacific in the face of climate change.”

The ‘Declaration on U.S.-Pacific Partnership, in my estimation, has abrogated the established order of PIF or Pacific regionalism. However, this does have a silver lining by giving precedence to a PICs-only forum whose fullest expression may have finally come.

---

© Kaliopate Tavola and kaidravuni.com, 2025. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Kaliopate Tavola, kaidravuni.com and Islands Business with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.