A COLUMN WRITTEN BY KALIOPATE TAVOLA, PUBLISHED IN ISLANDS BUSINESS, DEC 2022
The Republic of Korea (ROK) and 12 Pacific Island Countries (PICs) opted to step up their relations after the 5th meeting of their respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs that was held in Busan, ROK, last October. This was the first face-to-face meeting since 2021. The step-up decision came 11 years after the first ministerial meeting was held in 2011 and 27 years after ROK became a Dialogue Partner for the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 1995.
The step-up raises the level of the ministerial meeting to that of a summit. A summit, in diplomatic circles, is attended by Heads of States (HoSs) or Governments (HoGs). The Busan Communique states: “The Ministers agreed to expand the scope of future dialogue to reflect the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) membership and affirmed their will to work closely together to ensure the success of the 1st Korea-Pacific Islands Summit in 2023.”
Of the PICs, Kiribati, Samoa and the two French territories – (New Caledonia and French Polynesia) did not attend the meeting. Given the general acceptance of delegated decision-making that is central to the Pacific Way of resolving issues in PICs, it is expected that the four PICs absent from the Busan meeting will honour such a decision. Moreover, Australia and New Zealand (ANZ), developed country members of PIF, will similarly do so by virtue of their foundational membership of the Forum.
The proposed first Summit of 2023 is currently styled as the ‘1st Korea-Pacific Islands Summit’. Such nomenclature may appear restrictive from ANZ’s perspective. Time will tell, therefore, whether it will change in due course to ‘Korea-PIF Summit’ or even ‘ROK-PIF Summit’ – to be geostrategically-correct.
The ministerial decision above that configures the step-up intended intimates the likely origin of such concept. “Expand(ing) the scope of future dialogue” is reminiscent of the Post-Forum Dialogues (PFDs) during which ROK became a Partner in 1995. The annual dialogues during the time of the annual PIF Leaders (PIFL) meetings, however, will not be replaced by the newly constituted Summit.
From the beginning, PFDs were part and parcel of the annual PIF Leaders (PIFL) meetings. Attendance by PFD Leaders – HoSs) and/or HoGs therefore was the norm. It was expected. Over the years, however, attendance slackened and PFD Partners (PFDPs) were increasingly being attended by ministers on behalf of their respective HoSs/HoGs.
I recall that this was a matter of some concern at the PIF level. Moreover, the PIF was also concerned about PFDPs’ commitment to the region, especially to PICs’ general development. So much so, that PIF decided in 2011 to undertake triennial assessments of PFDPs and their contributions to regional development. The first triennial assessment took place the following year. Subsequent ones followed in 2015 and 2019.
The 2019 assessment was undertaken with the purpose of reviewing Forum Dialogue Partners’ ongoing alignment to Forum Dialogue Partners’ criteria and to the Forum’s regional priorities – particularly in the context of the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism and the 2018 Strategy for Forum International Engagement Advocacy. Of the 18 PFDPs, 13 provided reports.
It is interesting to note here PIFL’s own evaluation of the results of the assessment above. PIFL, it is noted, “recognized the importance of effective partnership and engagements, while noting with concerns that not all PFDPs were effectively engaging with the PIF.”
As if they were responding directly to this concern, ROK officials cooperated with their counterparts in the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) to raise the status and aspirations of the Busan meeting. Its theme was aspirational: ‘Vision of the Resilient Blue Pacific. Freedom, Peace and Prosperity.’ It further adds: ‘and in support of the 2050 Strategy.’ This last point is politically strategic in that it responds directly to the requirements of the PIFL’s resolutions at their 2019 meeting in Funafuti when they conceptualized the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.
It seems that the 5th ministerial meeting in Busan ticked all the boxes. PIFS’ Release after the meeting was titled: ‘Expansion for Blue Pacific – Korea relations as 5th Foreign Ministerial ends.’ The Release acknowledged that the meeting ‘ended…on a high note.’
The step-up to a summit-level dialogue is a reaffirmation of the intended status and level of the PFDs. It remains to be seen whether future attendances will be consistent with such a resurgence. Furthermore, the step-up to comprise the whole PIF membership is a natural extension given ROK’s foci and engagements in a range of PIF’s programmes and projects under the prevailing Framework for Pacific Regionalism. The ROK-PIF Cooperation Fund (RPCF), for example, is fully operational in the region. PIF’s website discusses 6 projects that are funded by the RPCF.
ROK is also strong on climate change, Disaster Risk Reduction and the environment. These augur well in the context of PIF’s Boe Declaration. Moreover, ROK’s stance on nuclear contamination is in harmony with that of PIF, given the on-going altercation with Japan as regards the latter’s decision to release more than one million tonnes of treated nuclear-terminated water into the Pacific Ocean.
ROK’s commitment is to align its efforts to the priorities of the 2050 Strategy, especially in the fields of Technology and Connectivity; Climate Change and Disasters; and Resources and Economic Development. Such alignment will naturally give rise to the prospect of multi-annual programmable Official Development Assistance (ODA). This is preferable to project-based approach ODA due to its predictability and transparency. Moreover, ROK’s priorities on climate change and disasters are critical for PIF especially for PICs’ given their leadership and advocacy role in the forefront of the global battle on climate change.
Now is an opportunity for PICs, with New Zealand support (already committed to Loss & Damage financing), to advocate for climate financing generally especially for Loss & Damage, an emerging priority for PICs. And if they can bring Australia in to the fold, there can be justification in PICs’ support for Australia to host the next COP jointly with them.
ROK’s inspiration to diversify its annual dialogues to include annual Summits is historically sound and it offers great promise for the future. These future promises however come with obligations. And ROK does not need to be reminded about this. Upping its ODA to PICs is perhaps a fait accompli in the context of its latest effort to restructure existing regional architecture and processes. ROK will have to be open to the prospects of some of its incremental ODA for capacity building in PICs and even in PIFS to enable it to offer technical assistance (TA) to PICs in need. Such capacity building and TA will be essential especially for Smaller Island States (SIS) where the opportunity costs for the increased demands on the time placed on officials and politicians to cope with the added workload will be high.
It remains to be seen how long it will take ROK to get closer to the leading three grantors to the Pacific, namely: Australia, USA and New Zealand, in that order.
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